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"[The Group of 7 antiterrorism efforts] will create a snowball effect."1 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
 
 
Over the course of the past 40 years, the threat that lethal political violence – terrorism – poses 
to individuals and the international community at large has become progressively more evident. 
It is thus hardly surprising that international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), 
dedicate a significant amount of attention to the problem of terrorism. Today, international 
organisations discuss targeted sanctions to fight terrorism, methods to stop the financing of 
terrorism, comprehensive approaches to suppress terrorism, or effective solutions to the 
problems posed by new terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL).2 The reactions of governments and international organisations to terrorism have 
received significant attention in the literature,  although predominantly by legal experts or 
scholars in Political Science, International Relations, and other social sciences.3 The history of 
                                                        
1 West German Foreign Minister Genscher quoted in 'Kartell gegen Luft-Terror,' Der Spiegel, no. 30 (1978), 16: 
16. 
2 See for instance Bernhard Blumenau, The United Nations and Terrorism: Germany, Multilateralism, and 
Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Peter Romaniuk, Multilateral 
Counter-Terrorism. The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), chapter 2; 
Ben Saul, 'Attempts to Define Terrorism in International Law,' Netherlands International Law Review 52, no. 01 
(2005), 57-83: 68-70. See also the relevant chapters in Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, eds., Countering 
the Financing of Terrorism (London ; New York: Routledge, 2008); Jane Boulden and Thomas George Weiss, 
eds., Terrorism and the UN: Before and after September 11 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004) 
and Giuseppe Nesi, ed., International Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism: The United Nations and Regional 
Organizations in the Fight against Terrorism (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006). See further 
Kennedy Graham, “The Security Council and Counterterrorism: Global and Regional Approaches to an Elusive 
Public Good,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 1–2 (2005): 37–65, Christopher Michaelsen, “The 
Security Council’s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Regime: ‘Essential Tool’ or Increasing Liability for the 
UN’s Counterterrorism Efforts?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 5 (2010): 448–63, Mahmoud Hmoud. 
“Negotiating the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism: Major Bones of Contention,” 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 4, no. 5 (2006): 1031–1041, 
3 Examples include Anna Oehmichen, Terrorism and Anti-Terror Legislation: The Terrorised Legislator?: A 
Comparison of Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Its Implications on Human Rights (Antwerp ; Portland Or.: 
Intersentia, 2009); Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law, Oxford Monographs in International Law 
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), Max Abrahms, "The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism 
Revisited," Comparative Political Studies 45, no.3 (2012): 366-393, Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not 
Work," International Security 31, no.2 (2006): 42-78, Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor, “Are Voters 
Sensitive to Terrorism: Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate,” American Political Science Review 102, no. 
3 (2008): 279-301, Christophe Chowanietz,“Rallying Around the Flag or Railing Against the Government? 
Political Parties' Reactions to Terrorist Acts,” Party Politics 17, no. 5 (2011): 673-698, Anna Getmansky and 
Thomas Zeitzoff, "Terrorism and Voting: The Effect of Exposure to Rockets on Voting in Israeli Elections," 
terrorism – as well as antiterrorism – is still understudied. By addressing earlier experiences of 
dealing with terrorism, important lessons for understanding the phenomenon today can be 
highlighted, which can help in the elaboration of solutions. The early 2000s were not the first 
time in history when terrorism appeared in a prominent position on the agendas of international 
organisations. Thirty years before, in the 1970s, terrorism was already burgeoning. Spurred by 
spectacular terrorist attacks, which created a state of fear all around the Western world, 
politicians and organisations began to deal with the risks that international terrorism could pose 
to their countries and societies.4 The Dutchman Klaas de Vries aptly summed up the prevalent 
mood, as well as the necessary responses to terrorism, in a report for the North Atlantic 
Assembly: 
[W]e are now faced with a blind terrorism which chooses targets not always significant in 
themselves. […] They [i.e. terrorist attacks] all provide proof that civilization is not 
protected from what is a mindless, murderous mentality, whatever philosophical or political 
alibis it might use. […] The fight against terrorism is of the same nature as the fight for 
human rights and cultural values against totalitarianism and intolerance. […] It is evident 
that terrorism has an international dimension. It is thus necessary that the reply to it should 
be international in the sense of close co-operation […] for the bringing to justice of the 
culprits and the breaking up of networks.5  
 
The number and severity of terrorist crises in the 1970s forced international organisations to 
deal with the phenomenon. Throughout the whole decade of the 1970s and beyond, the UN, for 
instance, debated measures against terrorism.6 In addition, the Organization of American States, 
the International Civil and Aviation Organization (ICAO), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, the European Communities (EC), and the Council of Europe also all found the 
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item of terrorism on their agendas.7 Given their focus on a specific region, technical matters, or 
security it is hardly surprising that terrorism was an issue for them to discuss. However, an 
entity that would not normally be associated with antiterrorism also attended to this matter: the 
Group of 7 (G7). Founded as a club of the most advanced industrial nations of the world to 
address macroeconomic issues, the G7, from 1978 onwards, progressively turned its attention 
towards political issues. The G7 efforts in the late 1970s and early 1980s to fight terrorism – or 
at least prevent a conducive environment for terrorists – serve as a primary example of this 
general trend.  
This article will assess the responses that the G7 designed in order to deal with terrorism, 
especially the Bonn Declaration on Hijacking of 1978, and whether the G7 efforts were 
successfully implemented. It will argue that the primary addressees of G7 antiterrorism efforts 
were not the terrorists as such, but the countries that cooperated with them or granted them 
asylum. The seven leading economic powers of the planet wanted to use their economic 
pressure – and their dominant role in international air traffic – to force states with sympathies 
for terrorists to prosecute them and deliver them to justice. The G7 members openly threatened 
to use their economic power as a tool to further a security-political agenda. While the general 
idea behind the Bonn Declaration was good and despite the fact that it certainly could have 
produced a more hostile environment for international terrorism, diverging economic and 
political interests among G7 members prevented the Declaration from ever living up to its 
potential. Soon after the summit in 1978, the G7 members realised the considerable legal, 
economic, and political costs that the Declaration could generate for themselves and decided to 
let it sink into oblivion.  
Besides drawing from the documents available in the political archive of the West 
German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt, AA), the article also incorporates material from 
American archives (the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and the National Archives at College 
Park), as well as from the British National Archives. This essay will shed new light not only on 
the history of terrorism, transatlantic relations, or the foreign policies of key Western countries, 
but also on the history of the G7 and how it developed from an entity focussed on economic 
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topics towards an institution aspiring to coordinate the member states’ cooperation on political 
matters.8 It will also highlight how former antiterrorism efforts within this important entity 
failed and why they failed. Geopolitical and economic interests mattered in the 1970s and 
prevented efficient responses to terrorism. These factors also influence multilateral 
antiterrorism efforts today, especially when faced with an emerging source of instability in the 
Middle East, such as ISIL. Therefore, this article will underline the importance of mustering 
sufficient support – and aligning the interests – of the governments concerned to effectively 
oppose terrorism. The lessons learnt (or not) in the 1970s still apply today. 
 
The Group of 7 
 
The G7 started as a number of economic summits initiated by French President Valérie Giscard 
d’Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. At the beginning, they intended to 
assemble the leaders of the six largest economic powers of the West to discuss the important 
macroeconomic consequences of the oil crisis in order to lead the West back onto the path 
towards economic recovery.9 The first summit took place in Rambouillet, France in 1975, 
followed by meetings in Puerto Rico in 1976, London in 1977, Bonn in 1978, Tokyo in 1979, 
Venice in 1980, and Ottawa in 1981. Giscard and Schmidt wanted to bring together the key 
decision makers to implement policies conducive to economic growth. Their idea was to go 
beyond the limitations of certain ministries and to establish a forum where they could discuss 
important economic issues in small and informal settings. That was why these meetings 
assembled the heads of governments rather than only ministers.10 Difficulties arose quickly, 
however, as to who would be invited to these meeting. It was clear that the biggest economies 
would have to be represented, hence the United States (US), Germany, Japan, France, and Great 
Britain. There were some discussions, though, about whether it was necessary to include the 
Italians since, as the Americans put it, they ‘would just clutter the landscape’.11 But Rome 
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protested so long that they were finally asked to participate as well.12 At the first meeting in 
Rambouillet on 15-17 November 1975, only these six countries were present. Canada, the US’ 
biggest trading partner, joined the group – despite French reservations – the following year and 
the G7 was established. A customary rule soon emerged to convene a meeting once every year. 
The president of the European Communities (EC) commission also took part in a consultative 
capacity as of 1977.13 The first meetings were dominated by economic matters but it soon 
transpired that foreign and security policy issues could not be ignored and would also have to 
be addressed.14 Terrorism was one such issue. 
 
The Bonn Declaration on Hijacking of 1978 
 
In October 1977, the Lufthansa plane ‘Landshut’ was hijacked and rerouted to Mogadishu, 
Somalia by Palestinian terrorists who were in league with the West German Red Army Faction 
(RAF). The skyjackers wanted to exert more pressure upon the West German government to 
release the RAF leadership around Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin from prison. The 
‘Landshut’ crisis was the climax of the ‘German Autumn’, which had started more than a month 
earlier when the president of the Federation of German Industries, Hanns Martin Schleyer, was 
kidnapped by the RAF, also with the intention of freeing their imprisoned leadership. The 
German government did not succumb to the pressure and would not release the prisoners. 
Instead, specialists of the counterterrorism unit Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG 9) stormed the 
hijacked plane and rescued all of the hostages. When the RAF prisoners learnt about the failed 
hijacking some of them, including Baader and Ensslin, committed suicide. The next day, the 
dead body of Schleyer was found after he had been shot by his kidnappers in retaliation for the 
GSG 9 operation in Mogadishu. With the hostages freed and Schleyer murdered, the ‘German 
Autumn’ came to a conclusion. While its end was generally seen as a victory of the German 
government over terrorism, the federal government increased its efforts to improve multilateral 
counterterrorism efforts, especially at the UN. But the G7, too, was soon to be entangled in 
international antiterrorism politics.15  
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During the fourth G7 summit, which took place in Bonn in July 1978, the discussions 
centred upon economic issues but the leaders also adopted a Bonn Declaration on Hijacking, 
less than a year after the ‘Landshut’ crisis. The Declaration stated that: 
The Heads of State and Government, concerned about terrorism and the taking 
of hostages, declare that their governments will intensify their joint efforts to 
combat international terrorism. To this end, in cases where a country refuses 
extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or do not 
return such aircraft, the Heads of State and Government are jointly resolved that 
their government shall take immediate action to cease all flights to that country. 
At the same time, their governments will initiate action to halt all incoming 
flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the country 
concerned. They urge other governments to join them in this commitment.16  
 
Interestingly, especially in the context of the recent German experiences with hijackings, the 
idea for such a statement was first brought forward not by Chancellor Schmidt but by Japanese 
Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda; and it was later picked up by Canadian Prime Minister Pierre 
Elliot Trudeau.17 The assassination of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro contributed to 
the proposal just as much as the fact that the host of the G7 summit, Germany, had just gone 
through the ‘German Autumn’.18 However, Japan itself had its own experiences with terrorism 
committed by the Japanese Red Army, and one motivation for the Japanese government might 
also have been the rather lax approach to terrorism that it had taken thus far and the criticism 
Tokyo had earned for this internationally.19 Proposing a somewhat symbolic declaration would 
have helped to improve Japan’s international reputation at little actual cost.  
The proposal was well received by the other heads of governments and the discussions 
about the wording of the statement took place during a luncheon on the last day of the summit, 
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on 16 July 1978.20 For Schmidt, the main focus of the Bonn Summit was supposed to be 
economics, which had been his and Giscard’s original idea behind setting up the G7. Terrorism 
was not even mentioned in the preparatory reports compiled by the Auswärtiges Amt for the 
chancellor.21 This lack of German initiative notwithstanding, Germany was soon to endorse the 
Declaration.  
The basic idea behind the Declaration was that although resolutions and conventions 
against aerial hijackings existed, no effective sanctions mechanism was in place against states 
that were unwilling to prosecute hijackers.22 These countries would thus remain safe havens for 
terrorists and closing them down, so the G7 members thought, would discourage future 
hijackers from committing their attacks. Consequently, in order to pressure all states into 
abiding by international treaties against skyjacking, it was the intention of the G7 Declaration 
to stop all commercial air traffic with a country that failed to cooperate in fighting air terrorism. 
The presumed efficiency of this threat lay in the fact that the G7 nations together at the time 
accounted for roughly 70 percent of all airline passengers transported in the non-communist 
world and their airlines were the major global carriers.23 They therefore had considerable 
weight and the willingness to use it. It was hoped that just the threat of a boycott would be an 
effective deterrent. According to Jimmy Carter, the statement was particularly aimed at 
stopping Libya from supporting hijackers: ‘Libya was the worst offender, so all of us [i.e. the 
G7 members] sent independent letters to Mu’ammar Gaddafi telling him privately that if this 
should occur again, all air traffic to and from his country would be terminated.’24 From the 
archives in Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US, however, there is no evidence to 
support this claim that the Declaration was particularly aimed at Gaddafi. Nor for Carter’s 
assertion that ‘[h]e [i.e. Gaddafi] canceled the practice immediately’.25 While Gaddafi’s 
flirtation with international terrorism might have influenced Fukuda and Trudeau, the more 
immediate motivations for proposing the Declaration can probably be found by looking at 
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recent Western encounters with terrorism around the hijackings of 1977 and Moro’s 
assassination. The Declaration would also be a strong signal to domestic audiences in the G7 
nations and the global public at large that the G7 leaders took the threat seriously and stood 
united to fight it.  
As far as the legal character of the text was concerned, it was understood by the G7 
nations that – at least for the moment – it would constitute a ‘statement of aspiration’ rather 
than a legally binding treaty.26 However, it still meant another step forward in the fight against 
international terrorism. Immediately afterwards, once the Declaration was publicised, President 
Carter declared that the G7 summit was already a huge success because of this Declaration 
alone.27 He expressed how important this text was to the US and how he would see it as a top 
priority.28 Carter also announced that the US would enter into negotiations with key countries 
in Europe and beyond to ensure their support for the Declaration.29 Likewise, once the 
Declaration was baptised after Bonn, the city where it was agreed on, the German government 
immediately endorsed it. Bonn informed the other G7 members that it intended to lead 
demarches globally to spread awareness about the Declaration among governments and to ask 
them to join it. Moreover, Bonn invited experts from the other G7 members to come to Germany 
in early August 1978 to discuss the concrete measures to be adopted in order to implement the 
Declaration.30 Given these developments, and despite this not being a German initiative, the 
German government now took a serious interest in the matter. The Declaration appeared to fit 
in neatly with the antiterrorism efforts going on at the UN, the Council of Europe, and the EC.31 
By making demarches globally, Germany also identified itself intimately with the Declaration. 
It had to appear to outsiders as an integral component of Bonn’s antiterrorism policies and in 
light of West Germany’s ongoing commitment to the Declaration, it was hardly noticed that 
this did not start as a German idea. This was certainly the intended impression and was 
welcomed by the federal government. The importance that Bonn attached to the document was 
also expressed at subsequent European Political Cooperation consultations. During a meeting 
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of the Political Committee of the EC, Germany pointed out that the G7 members would 
integrate the Declaration into their future antiterrorism and foreign policy, and Bonn would ask 
its EC partners to do the same.32 Consequently, the Declaration was now considered to represent 
the official policy line of the G7 members and was not merely an empty statement. Germany 
highlighted that it was seeking to use the G7 Declaration as a basis for further antiterrorism 
cooperation between European countries beyond the G7 membership.33 To attain this goal, 
Chancellor Schmidt also sent a personal message to his EC colleagues to ask them to support 
the Declaration. The motivation behind this was that most of the EC countries had important 
airlines and the deterrent value of the document would be much stronger if all of the EC 
countries applied it.34 Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher also quickly embraced the 
Declaration and publicly announced what had been discussed so far only behind closed doors: 
that Germany would seek support for the Bonn Declaration in other European institutions so 
that more and more countries adopted it and it would create ‘a snowball effect’.35 At the 
insistence of the Germans and the Americans, shortly after the Bonn summit the G7 members 
led demarches all around the world to persuade more countries to join and abide by the 
Declaration as well as to implement the ICAO conventions against hijackings. To further 
highlight the leading role that Germany had by now assumed in promoting the Declaration, 
these demarches were coordinated by the respective German embassies.36 
Yet the fact that the Bonn Declaration was a product of the big G7 nations also provoked 
resentment. Smaller EC members, for instance the Netherlands, were hesitant to support the 
Declaration as they had not been involved in its negotiation and were reluctant to simply accept 
a policy line that the big economic powers had dictated.37 Nonetheless, Germany was not 
willing to make concessions to the other EC members or let them have a say in the setting up 
of an implementation mechanism for the Declaration. It was argued that the talks were still at a 
very basic stage among the G7 members and that this issue should only be addressed within the 
EC framework once the G7 had come up with more concrete details and a policy that provided 
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a sound basis for discussions.38 France, also a G7 member, correspondingly insisted that the 
EC countries should be informed but not involved in the negotiations about the 
implementation.39 Obviously, the AA was afraid that it would be even more difficult to agree 
on standard procedures when more countries were involved in the negotiations at such an early 
stage. The recent negative experiences with EC debates on antiterrorism efforts certainly 
contributed to this assessment.40 To avoid tensions though, Schmidt, Genscher, and Germany’s 
ambassadors informed the other governments repeatedly and unofficially about the motivations 
behind the G7 Declaration and the ongoing negotiations about the implementation mechanism. 
They also promised to keep their colleagues apprised on any progress made.41 While Bonn did 
not want to involve smaller states in the negotiations, any impression of a ‘dictate’ was to be 
avoided in order not to jeopardise the support for the Declaration’s implementation among non-
G7 member states.  
 
The Implementation of the Declaration 
 
As evidence of Bonn’s intentions to quickly follow up on the summit declaration with 
guidelines on how to implement it, on 1 and 2 August 1978 a meeting of G7 experts took place 
in Bonn upon a German initiative and was presided over by the legal advisor to the German 
government, Carl-August Fleischhauer.42 During the meeting only technical aspects were 
discussed, in particular in relation to which offices in the member countries would be 
responsible for the implementation of the Declaration in case of an emergency.43 The G7 states 
agreed that the Declaration would take immediate effect and would be applicable to all 
hijacking situations. Moreover, in a specific hijacking crisis, a G7 contact group would be set 
up in order to consult and coordinate responses. It was also agreed that concerted diplomatic 
demarches would be made in order to gain broader support for the Bonn Declaration 
worldwide.44 As a result of this meeting, the Multilateral Anti-Hijacking Contact Group was 
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established to elaborate further steps to be taken and to convene in case of a specific crisis.45 
This group, however, would only meet on an ad hoc basis and would not become 
institutionalised.  
Yet there were only meagre signs of support for the Declaration outside of the G7. As 
of August 1978, Austria was the only European country that expressed interest in the text.46 
The Philippines were the most enthusiastic non-European nation to support the document.47 In 
general, however, countries were reluctant to endorse the Declaration openly. When the AA 
made a first assessment of the follow-up to the Declaration it noted that not even all of the G7 
countries fully supported the Declaration or the global demarches by the Germans. While 
Germany, the US, Canada, and Japan were in favour of further procedures, Italy pointed to 
some legal issues that prevented implementation of the Declaration and the UK was hesitant to 
translate it into policy, referring to internal bureaucratic struggles as the reason. The French 
also mentioned legal problems and were hesitant to support the German demarches. It can be 
assumed that London, Paris, and Rome began to realise that the Declaration could have 
significant economic and political costs if it was implemented. Despite these hesitations on the 
part of some G7 members, by September 1978, 26 countries had expressed support or at least 
a positive stance on the Declaration – albeit not always publicly. Another 31 were more 
reluctant, including the Soviets. However, only Tanzania and Nigeria openly opposed it.48 Still, 
scepticism prevailed. A few months after the Bonn summit, during the autumn of 1978, many 
countries, especially several EC members, maintained doubts about fully adhering to the 
Declaration.49 While the reasons were kept vague it can be assumed that the non-G7 members 
were unhappy with the perceived ‘dictate’ that the G7 had produced, without consultation, and 
that they were now supposed to endorse. Moreover, the internal struggles among G7 members 
as to how to proceed with the Declaration also did not add to its appeal for others. Why should 
other nations support a statement they had no part in negotiating when it was even contested by 
the states who had issued it? 
Against this backdrop of scepticism, the G7 states discussed whether to officially 
introduce the Declaration at the UN. But strong objections prevailed as the G7 governments 
feared that this might further complicate the parallel negotiations about the Hostages 
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Convention, another Western initiative.50 Therefore, in order not to jeopardise the latter project, 
the Declaration was only circulated at the UN so as to inform UN members of its existence but 
it was never placed on the agenda for discussion.51 The Germans in particular tried to keep the 
G7 Declaration from becoming an agenda item at the UN General Assembly. As the AA pointed 
out, the intention of the UN hostage project was to establish legal regulations for all cases of 
hostage-taking, while the Declaration only aimed to make states abide by the obligations they 
already had had under ICAO conventions.52 The anti-hostage project was clearly the bigger and 
more important endeavour and any potential problems that might obstruct its negotiations had 
to be avoided. Openly discussing the Declaration at the UN – especially in view of the exclusive 
nature of the club which had adopted it – did not fit within Bonn’s UN policy of avoiding any 
big controversies over terrorism.  
The cloudy prospects for the Bonn Declaration notwithstanding, after August 1978, 
there were two more follow-up meetings of the working group in order to discuss legal and 
procedural issues: one in late 1978 and another one in London in 1979. During these talks it 
transpired that the gap between those states in favour of continuing the implementation of the 
Declaration, primarily Germany and the US, and those sceptical of other measures, such as 
France, further broadened. The French took a very obstructive stance by stressing that bilateral 
air traffic agreements would have to be amended in order to provide for sound legal grounds 
for sanctions to be implemented under the Declaration. That would be a major effort and would 
require extensive renegotiation of existing international agreements. While the other six states 
did not share this radical point of view, these debates point to the dissent that was emerging 
among the G7. These debates also addressed issues regarding the legal nature of the Declaration 
as well as how committed governments would be in the future to support actions necessary to 
implement it – which might come at considerable costs.53 Despite the increasing hesitation on 
the part of many G7 members, Germany and the US were determined to continue the work on 
the issue. Even in early 1979, there was still a great deal of optimism in the US government 
regarding the possibility of further steps taken by the G7 on antiterrorism efforts.54 
Nevertheless, the promoters of the Declaration were to soon learn that it was likely to face the 
same obstacles that had been plaguing earlier multilateral initiatives. It was about to be drawn 
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into the vortex of debates about ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ terrorism. For instance, when the German 
ambassador made a demarche in Algiers to have Algeria subscribe to the Declaration, his 
interlocutors showed a general willingness to cooperate. But they also emphasised that 
antiterrorism issues should be left to the UN as it would be necessary to explore whether the 
Declaration touched upon the issue of national liberation movements.55 That was intended – 
and received – as a polite ‘no’. 
Moreover, during a meeting of EC Justice and Interior Ministers, they acknowledged 
the G7 Declaration and agreed to ‘adopt adequate measures to support the studies related to the 
implementation of the Declaration’.56 But that was lukewarm support at best. No clear 
commitments to implement the Declaration were made and no explicit endorsement expressed. 
While the internal cohesion among G7 members was vanishing, no additional support from 
other, external, states could be secured. For a text that was not legally binding but whose 
implementation and credibility largely depended on countries’ voluntary commitment to it, that 
was not a good sign. Yet, support, however weak, came from a different institution. The 
European Parliament urged the EC member states to endorse the Declaration and to promote its 
implementation elsewhere.57 Nevertheless, the actual significance of this motion, beyond the 
symbolic gesture, was marginal; no EC government reacted. 
When the G7 working group met for the last time on 8 and 9 May 1979 in London, no 
further obligations or procedures were approved; instead the diplomats only agreed that 
invitations were to be passed on to other states to adhere to the original Declaration.58 
Consequently, even a year after the Bonn Declaration was issued, no feasible mechanism had 
been designed to implement it. The G7 countries had only managed to designate authorities that 
would contact each other concerning procedural matters, start elaborating guidelines, and 
monitor hijacking crises.59 But that was all and it was certainly not a very presentable outcome, 
as it did not demonstrate the strong commitment of the G7 to the Declaration. Not surprisingly, 
the AA was very unhappy with the recent developments and the negotiations in London.  
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The main culprit was soon found in Paris. France was against the creation of a legal 
framework for the implementation of the Declaration because it feared that it would 
disadvantage its airline economically. For the same reason, non-G7 members such as the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, and Spain did not join the Declaration. 
Even the Germans themselves were uneasy about the legal questions that the Declaration would 
raise when really turned into an obligation under international law. As an internal AA 
assessment showed, implementing the Declaration required changes in 80 bilateral and 
multilateral treaties, all of which would need parliamentary approval. According to AA 
estimations, this process would take at least eight years and would become a massive 
organisational headache – not to mention the political and diplomatic problems attached to 
negotiating and adopting the changes.60 Faced with increasing obstacles, the Germans reduced 
their efforts to lobby for further implementation and the Declaration was discreetly pushed to 
the backburner.61  
By mid-1979, the prospects of the Declaration ever becoming an actual antiterrorism 
mechanism were fading and it seemed that the Declaration would be left to wither away. This 
development was hardly astonishing. As the Declaration failed to hold the expected symbolic 
value, it was only logical to remove it from public attention. Therefore, officials of the G7 
nations agreed that no more governments should be approached to join the Declaration and no 
further working group meetings were envisioned. Yet, in a last endeavour to have something 
positive to say about the Declaration, officials also acknowledged that no country had raised 
objections to the threat of a boycott against the airline of a country that supported terrorists. In 
the assessment of the experts, that, at least, pointed to a general opinio iure that the sanctions 
envisioned by the Declaration were acceptable to the international community at large and 
would not lead to a major outcry if they were ever to be applied. Moreover, the experts agreed 
that if in the future a country should express interest in subscribing to the Declaration, the 
respective German embassy would take the lead role in informing and negotiating with that 
government but no more active lobbying for the Declaration would be done.62 Given the 
seemingly insurmountable problems with the Declaration, there was a lack of willingness on 
the part of the G7 to actively pursue it any further. By now, the text was a statement showing 
their opposition to terrorism but it was not seen as a policy instrument. This can partially be 
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explained by the fact that the Hostages Convention was now about to be ratified at the UN and 
therefore, at last, a major legal success in the fight against terrorism was within reach. At the 
same time, serious and difficult negotiations were going on at the EC level about antiterrorism 
instruments that required a great deal of attention.63 In addition, no serious hijacking crisis such 
as the one in Entebbe in 1976 or in Mogadishu in 1977 had occurred. It seemed that aerial 
hijacking was going out of fashion and becoming less of an urgent problem. Add to this the 
obvious economic, political, and legal problems raised by the Declaration and the lack of 
enthusiasm about resuming negotiations about its implementation is comprehensible.  
By May 1979 in addition to the G7 members, only 14 countries had publicly declared 
that they would adhere to the Bonn Declaration.64 Others had alluded to cooperation in internal 
communications,65 but did not make any public statements of support.66 The fact that, aside 
from Iceland, no non-G7 European nation supported the Declaration any longer suggests that 
they still resented it as a ‘dictate’ on the part of the G7.  
 
The Bonn Declaration at Subsequent Summits 
 
The only time that the Declaration became a more serious concern for the G7 members again 
was when preparations for summit meetings were underway. Most of the G7 members, with 
the exception of Canada and Germany, were hesitant to make any reference to the Declaration 
in the Communiqué of the Tokyo meeting in 1979. Even the US had lost a lot of its initial 
enthusiasm for the Declaration. The Germans, however, believed it was vital for the credibility 
of the Declaration that it was referred to at subsequent G7 summits and so the Japanese Prime 
Minister made a statement reiterating the Declaration at the concluding press conference of the 
Tokyo meeting.67 In order to avoid the impression of the failure of G7 antiterrorism efforts, the 
G7 members decided to only highlight whatever positive developments they could observe in 
recent hijackings situations. Therefore, the summit noted with satisfaction that the hijacking 
crises that had occurred since mid-1978 did not require the application of the Declaration as all 
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of the countries involved cooperated and the perpetrators were either tried or extradited.68 While 
it is questionable as to how far this can be attributed to the deterrence effect of the Declaration, 
nevertheless the decline in severe hijacking incidents was optimistically interpreted as a 
successful outcome of the Bonn Declaration. It testifies to the fact that there was nothing better 
to report that could be directly tied to the Declaration’s deterrence value and thus demonstrates 
the zombie state of the text: it was reawakened from its grave once a year but was otherwise 
dead for all intents and purposes. 
In the 1980s, however, there was a short period when there was a chance that the 
Declaration might be revived. As a consequence of the Tehran hostage crisis, the US started an 
initiative with their G7 partners in early 1980, prior to the Venice summit, to reconvene the 
working group and to extend the Declaration’s scope to include embassy raids. The Americans 
soon dropped this idea, though, and preferred to have the summit adopt a separate declaration 
on embassy hostage crises. While the AA was in total agreement with the US that these crises 
were to be condemned, it feared the consequences of the Bonn Declaration being used as a 
template for the new declaration. Would the boycott idea also be applied to hostage situations 
involving diplomats? If so, would the new declaration oblige members to cut off economic or 
possibly even diplomatic ties with a country not willing to cooperate? The legal advisor to the 
federal government warned that the political repercussions of such an automatism could 
seriously damage German interests and spiral out of control.69 As the AA was very concerned 
about this US proposal with its ‘rigorist imbalances’, German diplomats developed a watered-
down counter proposal to be discussed by the ‘sherpas’ – the officials from G7 member states 
who prepared the summit.70 Against this backdrop, in late May 1980, the legal advisers of the 
G7 countries met to discuss the US proposal concerning embassy raids.71 Like the Germans, 
the Japanese and the Italians were also in favour of toning down the American proposal and 
promised each other further mutual assistance in that regard.72 This German-Italian-Japanese 
triangle persuaded the other members to adopt a political statement that condemned taking 
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diplomats hostage  but it would not create any legal responsibilities nor automatic responses. 
France was the only country reluctant to support it as the French seemingly wanted to keep the 
G7 summits free from any political issues at all.73 At the same meeting, when discussing the 
Bonn Declaration, the experts reiterated that the number of hijackings was in decline and that 
in recent hijacking crises all perpetrators could be apprehended. Conveniently, there was 
consequently no need for any extensive discussion of the Bonn Declaration and it was sufficient 
to simply restate it.74 Therefore, the Venice summit of 1980 − overshadowed by the highly 
politicised Tehran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan − issued a statement 
simply reiterating the continuing importance of the Bonn Declaration for the G7. The wording 
suggested, much like the year before, that the recent decrease in hijackings and their mostly 
peaceful solution could be attributed to the deterrence value of the Bonn Declaration.75 The 
statement made the Declaration seem like a success story whereas evidence is lacking to support 
this claim.  
After the Venice summit, the US wanted the Italians, as the host of the summit, to 
proceed with the declaration on hostage-taking much like with the Bonn Declaration of 1978. 
The Italians were to notify all of the governments in the world of it and ask them to join the 
hostage-taking declaration. The other six G7 members, including the Germans, were very 
sceptical about this. Dreading considerable political fallout, the six countries suggested keeping 
the hostage-taking text simply as a statement without even alluding to further actions being 
envisioned. Their main argument was that this approach would avoid an ‘erosion’ of other 
countries’ willingness to cooperate against terrorism as many countries might be ‘satiated’ by 
(read: fed up with) Western antiterrorism initiatives.76 
In 1981, at the summit meeting in Canada, the Bonn Declaration was once again 
reiterated because of Western claims that the pro-Soviet Afghan government would grant 
asylum to the hijackers of a Pakistani aircraft.77 But it was now also instrumentalised as a tool 
in the re-escalating Cold War. The Bonn Declaration was applied, for the first time, against 
Afghanistan and all air traffic (of G7 countries) with the country was suspended.78 Indeed, the 
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economic and political risks involved in this decision were minimal. Air traffic with 
Afghanistan, especially after the Soviet invasion, was only a marginal fraction of Western 
airlines’ general business and hitting the Soviet puppet regime with these sanctions would not 
lead to a major international outcry. On the contrary, it was a convenient way to strike at 
Moscow and to discredit the regime in Kabul as a supporter of international terrorism. These 
geopolitical considerations certainly influenced the decision to apply the Declaration in the 
Afghani case. Yet, Afghanistan was not the only situation where the Declaration enjoyed a 
revival. The Seychelles and the US threated to apply the Declaration later in 1981 to pressure 
South Africa to prosecute mercenaries who had hijacked a plane in order to escape the 
Seychelles after a failed coup d’état. South Africa yielded to the pressure and tried the culprits 
to save itself from a diplomatic embarrassment.79 
It is noteworthy that both instances were marginal cases without inherent risks, which 
explains the G7 members’ willingness to implement the Bonn Declaration. However, as serious 
aerial hijacking crises involving G7 countries were in decline in the early 1980s, there was little 
need to apply the Declaration anymore. This explains why it continued to be publically upheld 
and reiterated long after any real cohesion among the G7 members on the Declaration had 
vanished. In terms of practical importance, the Declaration had become a paper tiger. 
 
Conclusions 
 
As this article has shown, the efforts of the international community to fight terrorism in the 
1970s also extended to the recently established G7, despite the fact that the entity was primarily 
designed to discuss economic matters. The 1978 Bonn summit issued a Declaration that would 
                                                        
79 James J. Busuttil, 'The Bonn Declaration on International Terrorism: A Non-Binding International Agreement 
on Aircraft Hijacking,' The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 31, no. 3 (1982), 474-87: 474-75. This 
was an interesting situation as it clearly threatened South Africa with an economic boycott at a time when the 
Ronald Reagan administration was normally very hesitant to impose sanctions on South Africa due to its alleged 
strategic importance in the Cold War. This was a noteworthy step years before the US policy on South Africa 
officially changed in the mid-1980s. One reason for the US decision might be that the threat was communicated 
to South Africa before official sanctions were taken and the government could thus save face, Moreover, the 
sanctions had nothing to do with South Africa’s apartheid policy and were therefore not a change of US policy 
per se. One can argue, however, that it was also a signal to the government of Prime Minister Pieter Willem 
Botha that the US support for his country had limits. On the general US policy towards South Africa see for 
instance Lynda M. Clarizio, Bradley Clements, and Erika Geetter, “United States Policy toward South Africa,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 11, no. 2 (May 1989), 249-94: 251; Y. G.-M. Lulat, United States Relations with South 
Africa: A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 245-90; 
Alex Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994: Conflict of Interests, 1st ed 
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 111-22. 
 
come up, one way or another, during the subsequent years. While initially there were high hopes 
and ambitious plans attached to the Declaration, it would never become an institutionalised 
antiterrorism instrument. The Bonn Declaration should be seen as a statement of principle by 
the G7 – nothing more – and the G7 would not become a trendsetter in international 
antiterrorism efforts. The fact that the Declaration was adopted by the elite club of G7 members, 
a group that already raised considerable suspicion among smaller nations, prevented the text 
from ever being endorsed by a significant group of important countries – irrespective of the 
technical and legal questions its implementation would raise. As the interests related to the 
Declaration were so diverse even among G7 members, with France and Germany at opposite 
poles of the debates, the unanimity needed for the text to ever become more than a mere 
statement of aspirations was not achievable. National economic and political interests, even 
among extremely like-minded Western countries, differed to such an extent that made efficient 
and concerted multilateral antiterrorism cooperation extremely difficult, if not outright 
impossible. While it was a signal to the world that the biggest economic powers were willing 
to cooperate against terrorists, its nature as a ‘dictate’ of the G7 could have endangered the 
credibility of the Group as such but also of its individual member states. Moreover, the potential 
for conflict among the members on the issue of the implementation soon saw the text degraded 
to the role of a paper tiger. No one in the G7 had the intention of letting open conflict among 
the members erupt over this issue when the purpose of the G7 as a whole was to demonstrate 
Western unity and willingness to act together. Even the initially very enthusiastic supporters of 
the Declaration, Germany and the US, realised the detrimental effects that an overly close 
association with the Declaration could have on their geopolitical and economic interests as well 
as reputations. Therefore it was deliberately made a minor issue.  
When even German and American support for the Declaration declined, no G7 country 
had a significant interest in applying the Declaration any longer, so by 1979 it had become a 
mere footnote to be cited at future G7 meetings. The ‘snowball effect’ that Genscher had hoped 
for, involving an ever increasing number of countries subscribing to this antiterrorism initiative, 
never materialised. In fact, the Declaration would only be implemented once, against 
Afghanistan in 1981: a – politically speaking – insignificant country and a Soviet proxy. The 
application of the Declaration here came at very little costs. Yet, the Declaration did have 
restricted deterrence value: the mere threat of implementing it against South Africa was 
sufficient to make the country abide by it. However, the limited success of the Declaration lay 
more in the frantically upheld symbolic value it carried rather than in its practical implications. 
Still, looking at the broader context, the Declaration points to the general importance 
that the international community attached to multilateral antiterrorism efforts at the time and 
how this topic permeated many different organisations. Insofar as the G7 was concerned, the 
Declaration pinpointed a development that took the G7 away from discussing only economic 
issues towards an approach that progressively included political and security matters as well. 
This evolution continued throughout the next decades and, in 2014, manifested itself again 
when the other G8 members uninvited Russia from their meetings in response to the Russian 
annexation of the Crimean peninsula. This shows that security issues and foreign politics, as 
well as terrorism, still have a steady impact on G7 agendas today. On 25 September 2014, for 
instance, the G7 foreign minister unequivocally condemned ISIL and expressed support for a 
‘comprehensive and coordinated, long-term effort to degrade and defeat ISIL’. The G7 
ministers also endorsed the ‘military action as taken by the US and other countries [, which] 
represents an important contribution to helping Iraq to defend itself against ISIL and to deprive 
ISIL of safe havens.’80 What a long way the Group had come from the early fireplace meetings 
centred on macroeconomic issues, which were discussed in Rambouillet in 1975. The 
antiterrorism efforts of the G7 in the late 1970s and early 1980s were the G7’s first and careful 
steps towards coping with security issues and terrorism. By the mid-2010s, political and 
security matters have become tightly intertwined and have assumed a solid place on G7/8 
agendas. What is more, the group has become a conscious antiterrorism actor as well. 
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